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The Problem with Arbitration
Agreements
Stephen J. Choi*
Arbitration procedures today have become highly standardized.
Institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),1
the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA),2 and the
American Arbitration Association Center for International Dispute
Resolution (AAA)3 each have detailed provisions for administering
arbitration proceedings (often involving parties of different
nationalities). 4 Parties entering into arbitration can expect to have
limited discovery, a hearing, and the ability to bring attorneys to the
proceedings. 5 While typically providing less process than formal court
proceedings, 6 the standardized nature of arbitration can lead parties
to view arbitration much like court proceedings-a fixed, predetermined process to settle disputes. Thomas Carbonneau's article,
The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration
Agreements, reminds us of the contractual roots of arbitration. While
arbitration has become standardized, parties retain the ability to
vary aspects of arbitration. Carbonneau points out various ways in
which parties may modify arbitration terms and makes the normative
claim that sophisticated parties should affirmatively consider doing
so.

7

In Carbonneau's idealized world of contracting, parties would
take into account a variety of factors in tailoring their agreement to
fit the specific needs of the parties.8 Among other things, Carbonneau

* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Special thanks
to Un Kyung Park.
1.
See http://www.iccwbo.org/indexcourt.asp (last visited July 20, 2003)
[hereinafter ICC].
2.
See http://www.lcia-arbitration.com (last visited July 20, 2003) [hereinafter
LCIA].
3.
See http://www.adr.org (last visited July 20, 2003).
4.
For a description of the various international arbitral institutions, see
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
773, 796-801 (2002).
ICC
Rules
of
Arbitration,
available
at
5.
See
generally
http://www.iccwbo.org/english/arbitration/pdf_ documents/rules.
6.
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of
ArbitrationAgreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1189.
7.
Carbonneau writes: "Custom-fitting arbitration to the parties and the
transaction, while maintaining the functionality of the process, is the cardinal
objective." Id. at 1203.
8.
Id. at 1204.
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describes how parties may wish to customize the following: the
governing law; 9 the venue for arbitration (and the corresponding
rules of practice for foreign attorneys); 10 whether arbitration is to
take place on an ad hoc basis or under the auspices of one of the
institutional arbitration providers (including the ICC and the
LCIA); 11 how the arbitrators are to be selected (and their
compensation and qualifications); 1 2 what devices to employ to foster
collegiality among multiple arbitrators and provide for their
accountability;' 3 who is to have ultimate authority in the arbitration
proceedings (the arbitral institution, the arbitrators, or the parties to
the dispute); 14 procedural aspects of the arbitration including
discovery, evidentiary rules, and how witnesses are handled;' 5
whether arbitrators must provide reasons with their decision; 16 and
17
finally the standard of judicial review for arbitration awards.
As a starting point to assess Carbonneau's article, assume that
different contracting parties would in fact desire varying arbitration
agreement terms. Some parties might prefer extensive discovery
while others might not. Some contracting parties might wish to have
attorneys present during an arbitration hearing while others might
prefer to represent their own interests more informally. Given
varying preferences for arbitration terms, what might cause parties
not to negotiate for different arbitration agreement terms? One
possibility is that parties may lack the sophistication to negotiate an
agreement in their best individual interests. For consumers faced
with mandatory arbitration, imposed through contracts of adhesion,
such a concern is certainly material. However, Carbonneau has a
different set of parties in mind: sophisticated business parties often
contracting across international boundaries.1 8 Carbonneau is correct
in arguing that such parties-should they desire-possess the ability
to negotiate for highly specific arbitration contracts.
A fundamental question therefore arises from Carbonneau's
analysis: why do sophisticated parties not already internalize

9.
Id. at 1218.20.
10.
Id. at 1225-30.
11.
Id. at 1206-09.
12.
Carbonneau provides an example of a possible qualification stipulation: "A
Muslim party, for example, might insist that all arbitrators be male because an
arbitral award rendered by a tribunal which includes a female arbitrator is generally
not enforceable in a Muslim country." Id. at 1210.
13.
Carbonneau writes: "Whatever the parties' other aims, appointing a group
of decision-makers who can work well together may be the most critical objective of
all." Id. at 1215.
14.
Id. at 1217-19.
15.
Id. at 1221.
16.
Id. at 1221-22.
17.

Id. at 1222-24.

18.

Id. at 1191.
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Carbonneau's advice and tailor arbitration agreements? Put another
way, why do sophisticated parties (presumably represented by
attorneys) need Carbonneau's article to remind them of the ways in
which they can modify arbitration agreements? 19 Simply possessing
the ability to negotiate complex arbitration agreements does not
necessarily mean that parties will desire to do so. Even for
sophisticated parties, contracting is an expensive proposition for
several reasons. 20 First, parties must consider how others (including
courts) may interpret the wording of newly negotiated contractual
terms. Michael Klausner, among others, has written on the value of
certainty in contract terms. 2 1 Parties attempting to craft variations to
standardized terms run the risk of having a court (or other
interpreting body) later misinterpret the terms. The more parties use
a standardized term over time, the more certainty the term
achieves-giving rise to a network externality effect. 22 Even
substandard arbitration terms may then persist, to the extent parties
fear the uncertainty from deviating from such terms.
Second, network externalities may also arise due to the
interaction of a particular arbitration agreement term with the
arbitration industry. 23 Many different parties play varying roles in an
arbitration proceeding, including both the arbitrators themselves and
attorneys. These different role players develop a set of skills specific
to particular types of arbitration. Modifications to standardized
arbitration agreements may generate higher costs for these related
parties. Parties who employ a different set of discovery rules, for
example, may force attorneys to expend time and effort in

19.
As Carbonneau puts it: "Because the standard clause is simple,
straightforward, and well-known, there is an understandable reluctance among legal
practitioners and business parties to deviate from its established pattern." See id. at
1202-03.
20.
Carbonneau himself recognizes this expense writing: "Customization
requires negotiations and greater cost at the outset of the transaction. The additional
expense and frustration could undermine the deal or compromise its implementation."
Id. at 1231.

21.

See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Network of

Contracts,81 VA. L. REV. 757, 774-79 (1995).
22.
Network externalities in contracts involve spillover effects from the use of a
particular contract term by other contracting parties. Network externalities in
contracts may cause parties to choose even inefficient terms (due to their certainty
value from widespread use). See id. at 780-82.
23.
Klausner terms this a "common practice" network externality:
The prospect of common practices that develop in the future to implement a
contract term is thus a network benefit. Such a benefit can be expected to arise
only if a term is commonly used. The more commonly firms use a particular
term, the more reliable, and hence more valuable, common practices
implementing the term can be expected to be.

Id. at 781.
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determining exactly how the new set of discovery rules are different
from the standardized rules-leading to higher fees for the parties to
24
the arbitration.
Third, the very act of negotiating for a specific contract term may
signal negative information to the other party. Where the norm is for
most parties to accept the standardized arbitration terms, 25 other
parties may view with suspicion a party who attempts to deviate from
the standard. Because modification is expensive, parties who seek to
negotiate such a change will do so only if the benefits exceed this
expense, 26 such as in the case of parties who believe that arbitration
is relatively more likely. Why bother negotiating over an arbitration
term if a party believes that a dispute is unlikely? Other parties may
therefore view an attempt to negotiate over an arbitration term as a
signal that the party seeking to negotiate believes that arbitration is
more likely (perhaps because the party attempting to negotiate is
more contentious than the norm). Other parties may then decide not
to contract at all with the negotiating party (or demand a price
adjustment for the added risk involved).
Fourth, even sophisticated parties may suffer from a variety of
behavioral biases which may hinder their ability to negotiate for
contract terms. People, for example, suffer from the well-documented
overoptimism bias. 27 Entering into a contract, sophisticated parties
may over-optimistically believe in their ability to enter into valueincreasing business deals and that conflict will not arise in the future.
With such a belief, parties may decide that the benefit of specifically
tailoring an arbitration clause is simply not worth the cost.
Despite the lack of incentive of individual sophisticated parties
to negotiate over new contract terms, the market may devise ways to
generate real choice in arbitration agreements. Institutions such as
the ICC 28 and LCIA, 29 for example, already design their own
standard set of arbitration terms for use within their own sponsored
arbitrations.3 0 To the extent variations exist between ICC and LCIA

24.
See id. at 782.
25.
A norm of simply accepting standardized terms may arise, for example, due
to the generally high cost of negotiating for new terms (and the uncertainty of such
terms) as discussed earlier in this comment. See id. at 785.
26.
Id.
27.
Over-optimism may affect experts (or those who perceive themselves as
experts) in particular. See generally John Jacob et al., Expertise in Forecasting
Performance of Security Analysts, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 51 (1999); Michael Mikhail et
al., The Development of Expertise: Do Security Analysts Improve their Performancewith
Experience?, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 131 (Supp. 1997); Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The
Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411
(1992).
28.
29.

ICC, supra note 1.
LCIA, supra note 2.

30.

ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 5.
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terms, parties have some choice in selecting between the two. 3 1
However, market forces work to keep arbitration choices limited.
Institutions that take it upon themselves to set up arbitration
proceedings and the underlying rules governing the arbitrations must
convince parties that the organizations (and the arbitrators
associated therewith) will not take advantage of the parties. How can
one party, for example, be assured that an arbitral institution will not
favor the other side unduly (perhaps in the selection of the specific
arbitrators for a proceedings)? 3 2 Similarly, what assurances do
parties have that an arbitral institution will faithfully adhere to its
rules of arbitration in administering a proceeding or apply agreed
33
upon substantive law?
Reputation provides one answer. Arbitral institutions (and
arbitrators) may develop a reputation for unbiased, competent, and
efficient decision making over time. This reputation allows the
arbitral institution to charge a higher fee for its services. The
prospect of receiving a flow of elevated fees then works to deter the
arbitral institution from sacrificing its reputation in any specific
arbitration proceeding. 34 Reputation, however, is not cost free.

31.

See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 797:

The LCIA Rules of Arbitration are more accessible than their ICC counterpart,
which seems to be mired in the franglais foibles of French-to-English
translation and composition. Historically, among international lawyers, LCIA
arbitration has been perceived as English arbitration and linked to English
court supervision of the merits of arbitral awards.
32.
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 248 (1979). William Landes and Richard Posner note that
parties entering into an arbitration face a dilemma in the selection of arbitrators. Id. A
party who knows she is in the wrong will delay as much as possible in selecting an
arbitrator in order to avoid the proceedings, undermining the value of arbitration in
the first place. Id. Arbitral institutions such as AAA avoid such a problem by making
the final arbitrator selection itself (after receiving some input from each party). Id.
33.
See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing
Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 721-27 (1999) (discussing the
privatization of substantive law through arbitration and noting that "[i]n most cases in
which an arbitrator does not apply the law, it will be virtually impossible for a court to
discover that the arbitrator did not apply the law"); see also Cameron L. Sabine,
Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel: Private Arbitration and the Need for Public
Oversight of Arbitrators,87 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1343-44 (2002):
[A]rbitrators often disregard arbitration agreements or contract terms. Most
problematic, however, is the charge that arbitrators are biased, partial, or
influenced by conflicts of interest, or that arbitration awards are procured
through fraud or corruption. Connected to these allegations are claims that
arbitrators pander to repeat players, an allegation supported by recent studies.
34.
But see Sabine, supra note 33, at 1368 (arguing that status quo exemplifies
that "regulation by the market does not provide an adequate check on arbitrator
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Because reputational bonding. relies on high future profits, arbitral
institutions with a large market share (and correspondingly greater
profits) will provide the greatest assurance for parties.3 5 Greater
market share and the need to sustain high profits to provide a
reputational bond necessarily limit competition among arbitral
institutions. 36 Upstart providers of arbitration services will have a
difficult time convincing consumers of their expertise and credibility.
Consumers of arbitration services therefore may end up with both
high fees and fewer choices among arbitration bodies.
So how can we generate greater choice in arbitration proceedings
while at the same time keeping fees down and preserving the
credibility of arbitral institutions? One possibility is that lawmakers
may seek to reduce the bonding costs for potential providers of
arbitral services. Imposing liability on arbitrators and arbitral
institutions-something typically not allowed (outside of narrow
exceptions) under current law in the United States and other
states 37-provides
one possible mechanism of ensuring arbitrator
fidelity without resorting to high-cost reputational bonding. Indeed,
for arbitral institutions and arbitrators otherwise unable to convince
contracting parties of their credibility, government imposed liability
may provide a low-cost alternative to reputational bonding.
Significantly, increased liability does not have to be mandatory. One
could imagine a system in which lawmakers allowed arbitral
institutions and arbitrators to "self-tailor" the liability they would
face if they took unfair advantage of one of the arbitrating parties,
allowing institutions and arbitrators to increase liability above some
minimum floor. 38 Alternatively, lawmakers may allow arbitral

behavior. Nor can a solution depend on private arbitration associations policing
arbitrators because enforcement is discretionary, inconsistent, and arguably fictional").
35.
Id. at 1368-69.
36.
See Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 796 (noting that "[a] number of
traditional service-providers have a virtual lock upon the transborder arbitration
service industry . . . [making it] difficult for newcomers to establish a foothold in the
area").
37.
See Sabine, supra note 33, at 1350 (discussing how courts in the U.S. have
given arbitrators the equivalent of common law judicial immunity for judges); David I.
Bristow, Q.C. & Jesmond Parke, The Gathering Storm of Mediator & Arbitrator
Liability, 55 DISP. RESOL. J. 14, 16 (2000) ("In the United States, the view of
arbitrators as possessing a level of arbitral immunity is so well established in tort law
that it is rarely challenged"). But see Susan D. Franck, The Liability of International
Arbitrators:A Comparative Analysis and Proposalfor Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2000) (noting that "[tiraditionally, civil-law and several
Arab countries emphasize the contractual nature of the arbitrator's receptum arbitri
and use this as a baseline for establishing potential liability").
38.
Policy reasons nonetheless exist for maintaining the present level of
arbitrator immunity. See, e.g., Bristow & Parke, supra note 37, at 16 (noting two
arguments in support of arbitrator immunity: "1. adjudicators perform an important
societal function which deserves all possible encouragement and support; and 2.
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institutions and arbitrators to opt into a higher level of judicial
review of arbitration decisions (for a fee to cover the cost of the
increased judicial review) 39 or a particular level of enforcement of
arbitration awards. Upstart arbitral institutions in particular may
benefit the most from such a self-tailored liability regime. By opting
for relatively high levels of liability to signal their credibility to
contracting parties, upstarts may enhance their ability to enter the
arbitration market and compete with more established arbitrators
40
and institutions.
Government assisted bonding for arbitrators extends to the
international arena. No single government has the ability to monitor
and enforce liability awards against arbitrators and institutions
located in disparate locations worldwide. Nonetheless, to the extent
at least some arbitrators and arbitral institutions value the low-cost
bonding possible through government imposed liability, these private
actors will voluntarily adjust their behavior to maximize the impact
of such liability. Arbitrators and arbitral institutions that choose to
face a higher degree of liability imposed by state X, for example, may
shift greater amounts of assets into state X to increase the
enforceability of a potential liability award (and thereby the
credibility signal sent by placing themselves under state X's liability
regime).
In sum, Carbonneau deserves praise for providing a roadmap for
parties interested in modifying their arbitration agreements.
Underlying Carbonneau's seemingly intuitive points about the

adjudicators need immunity to protect them from reprisals that could otherwise
undermine the integrity of the decision making process"). Making increases in liability
voluntary on the part of arbitrators (and arbitral institutions) allows the arbitrators to
choose the level of liability that best balances the need to bond their credibility while
also protecting the independence of their decision making.
39.
More judicial review, on the other hand, may undermine the finality of
arbitration awards and raise the expected costs to parties faced with arbitration. See,
e.g., Ware, supra note 33, at 722-23. If given a choice, nonetheless, institutions will
weigh the downside of greater judicial review against the upside of the increased
credibility lent by it. Where institutions take into account their own direct interests as
well as the interests of disputing parties (to the extent the fees the parties are willing
to pay turn on the arbitral institution's decision with respect to judicial review), such a
choice maximizes the joint welfare of arbitral institutions and the disputing parties.
40.
Other problems, of course, exist with arbitration contracts apart from
providing private parties greater choice (and lower costs). Parties choosing to arbitrate
ignore the loss to the public from not having a case litigated in court where it may
generate precedential value for other cases. See Landes & Posner, supra note 32, at
238-40 (noting the advantage of state provided adjudication in avoiding the
underproduction of precedents in private adjudication). On the other hand, parties who
settle also impose the same loss of precedence on other parties. As well, parties who
choose to continue through the courts (at least in the United States) are subsidized to
the extent they do not bear the full cost of operating the judicial system (including the
salary of judges, among others).
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contractual nature of arbitration, however, is the puzzle of why
sophisticated parties typically choose not to tailor their agreements,
instead opting into standardized arbitration procedures. Several
obstacles stand in the way of even sophisticated parties seeking to
tailor their arbitration agreements. Arbitral institutions provide one
solution to the high cost of contracting through the provision of offthe-rack standardized arbitration proceedings. However, the need to
maintain a high reputation necessarily results in reduced competition
among arbitral institutions to provide new contract choices for
parties. To generate greater choice, governments may therefore have
a role in assisting competition in the market for arbitration services,
through, for example, a regime of self-tailored liability for arbitrators
and arbitral institutions.

